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the major meanings of the  as appearing throughout his early and his late philosophy. Our study will suggest 
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philosophy in general, starting from his earliest philosophical texts until his descriptions of his own philosophy in his late 
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1. persona 
It is fairly known nowadays that Nietzsche viewed philosophy as a very personal and intimate experience [1]. 
with Nietzsche the man, with his personality, his temperament, his moods, his chagrins, his passions, his loves 
philosophical signatures. This might seem as just one of his many rhetorical strategies for personalizing  or 
simply publicizing  his own philosophy, by bringing more color into his philosophical writing. On one hand, it 
is, undeniably, just that. On the other, we might say that, by fashioning philosophy as his philosophy or as a new 
style,  or, to use his own words, by fa
[2], he is, sometimes even desperately, searching for a new way to define philosophy  as 
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such. Inspired by his fresh view on philosophy as style,  Nietzsche was also convinced that his writing was 
nks only in the linguistic form:   
Fundamental solution: we believe in reason, but this is the philosophy of grey concepts; language is built in terms of the most naïve 
prejudices; now we read disharmonies and problems into things because we think only in the form of language (wir nur in der sprachlichen 
Form denken)   no longer want to 
think within the constraints of language, we just manage to reach the suspicion that there might be a boundary here  [3]. 
In this respect, philosophical thinking appears not as an activity in itself, independent of its medium of 
transmission or communication, or independent of the manner in which thinking is communicated, but as an 
[1]. This 
conviction unlocks several possibilities: that there are as many philosophies, as there are philosophical writers; 
ophy  there  is always the possibility 
put into words  one of my several philosophies  which doe love for knowledge,  
probably out of pride, but may desire a more modest name, even a repulsive one, which in turn may contribute to 
the fact that it remains what it desires to be: a philosophy for myself  with the slogan:  satis sunt mihi pauci, 
satis est unus, sati [1] (my translation). 
The complete quote, which appears in Seneca [4], Epistulae 7.11, addresses the particular relation of philosophy 
to its audience:  
hi pro populo est et populus pro uno, one is to me a thousand, and a thousand as one. And well hath he spoke 
(whoever he was, for the author is not known) who to one that asked him,
the better for?, a few are enough for me, nay, one is enough, or no one at all. 
And more excellent is the third: when Epicurus was writing to one of his fellow-students, these things, says he, I write not to the many, but to 
you alone; satis enim magnum alteri theatrum sumus, for we are to each other a theatre large enough. These, my Lucilius, are the things 
which I would have you treasure up in your mind, that you may despise the vain pleasure, that accrues from the approbation of the world. 
Many praise thee: but are you satisfied with yourself, if you are what they take you for and applaud? Let your goodness be approved within
(Seneca, 1786: 21) 
critus and Epicurus) debates chiefly the issue of the 
ideal audience of philosophy. Nietzsche, following Seneca, suggests that philosophy  may act as a theatrical 
persona in a play  (theatrum) which can be addressed to few spectators or to one single spectator (the single 
reader or hearer of the philosophical text produced by the philosophical author, or the single spectator or 
participant to the philosophical debate or philosophical dialogue), or to no real spectator at all: philosophy can 
ultimately exist as a dialogue with your own self, as a form of meditation or confession. Probably this explains 
in his Epistles 
[4] provides answers to a particularly interesting set of philosophical questions, questions which have been raised 
and re-raised many times throughout the history of ancient philosophy, questions which emerge initially in the 
writings of the early Sophists and then reappear at the core of the Socratic dialogues: Is there an appropriate way 
of communicating philosophy? What is the ideal audience of a philosophical discourse (in text, speech or 
dialogue)? Is philosophy the best kind of communication? Alternately, this issue unfolds another set of mind-
boggling questions: Is philosophy possible without it being communicated as such? Is philosophy autarkical, i.e. 
self-sufficient in its representation?  
Thus, it is fair to say that  acts as a persona throughout his work, capturing the many 
moments, moods, sides,  it has been given many special roles, each of them 
 philosophical worldviews at a certain point.  Without overstating, we might 
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discuss upon some of th  
prominent topics of discussion.     
2. life-style (politeia) 
The Greek-English Lexicon of Liddell and Scott [5] defines the ancient Greek term politeia, as 
citizenship, civil polity, , , .
Patristic Greek Lexicon of G. 
life, , ,
conduct, , s beh . The Greek term politeia thus carries within itself 
 self-government, -  Later, 
onduct, conversation, lat.) 
,
For the life of an individual, politeia life-style.  Philosophy as politeia (the act of 
, or not) was one of the basic meanings for the 
philosophical endeavour since the first steps of philosophia in the ancient Greek world. Alongside love of 
knowledge and wisdom, pursuit of the truth, speculation, investigation of truth and nature [5], philosophia would 
also mean the act of leading a well-balanced life, according to the principles of your teaching or doctrine. 
-re
works of late pagan, as well as Christian writers [5]. The testimony of the deeds and teachings of Socrates in 
-e; 30 b-c) is a powerful proof for the fact that Socrates saw philosophy as a 
constant struggle to be in accordance with the precepts of your own teachings. It is no accident that the title of 
-c, Socrates is 
explicitly explaining his c
Later, the Stoics and the other schools will embrace the same Socratic understanding of the term philosophia  to 
[7], will explicitly use the 
, :  
 
How long do you put off thinking yourself worthy of the best things, and never going against the definitive capacity of reason? You have 
received the philosophical propositions that you ought to agree to and you have agreed with them. Then what sort of teacher are you still 
waiting for, that you put off improving yourself until he comes? You are not a boy any more, but already a full-grown man. If you neglect 
things and are lazy and are always making delay after delay and set one day after another as the day for paying attention to yourself, then 
without realizing it you will make no progress but will end up a non-philosopher all through life and death [7]. 
 
Nietzsche will often refer to philosophy as a life-style (as the practical embodiment of philosophical thinking), 
or as a form of the ) [1]. He was himself a vocational 
philosopher, he never taught philosophy at a university. He saw philosophy as a personal, spiritual endeavour, 
and he practiced it following the manner of the Greeks: as a tool for creating your own persona, as a personal, 
constant struggle to live in accordance to your own teachings, to master your own self. He was deeply influenced 
by Socrates, although he criticized the Socratic method countless times. He also kept the Stoics in very high 
regard. He knew Stoicism first- erstanding of 
 which is regarded self-mastery:  is is 
our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits well, let us work on it with all our malice and love 
 
relation to Stoicism is not one of constant admiration. Especially in the On the Genealogy of Morals, he will 
- -
 -crea . 
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3.  Philosophy as History  
Nietzsche also suggests that philosophy is ultimately not just a personal, but also a historical and cultural 
endeavour, as the cultural and historical aspects really shape philosophy. In other words, philosophy is culture, 
heavily reliant on a certain context, and historical at its very core:  
How philosophy is done today.  I have observed that our philosophising youths, women and artists of today want of philosophy precisely the 
opposite of that which the Greeks derived from it! He who does not hear the continual rejoicing which resounds through every speech and 
counter-speech of a Platonic dialogue, the rejoicing over the new invention of rational thinking, what does he understand of Plato, of the 
philosophy of antiquity? In those days, souls were filled with drunkenness at the rigorous and sober game of concept, generalization, 
refutation, limitation with that drunkenness which the great ancient rigorous and sober contrapuntal composers perhaps also knew. In those 
days there still lingered on the palate of the Greeks that other, more ancient and formerly all-powerful taste: and the new taste presented so 
magical a contrast to this that they sang and stammered of dialectics, the 'divine art', as though in a delirium of love. That ancient way, 
however, was thinking under the spell of custom, for which there was nothing but established judgments, established causes, and no other 
reasons than those of authority: so that thinking was an imitation and all pleasure in speech and language had to lie in the form. (Wherever the 
content is thought of as eternal and universally valid, there is only one great magic: that of changing form, that is to say of fashion (my 
emphasis). In their poets, too, from the time of Homer onwards, and later in their sculptors, what the Greeks enjoyed was not originality but 
its opposite.) It was Socrates who discovered the antithetical magic, that of cause and effect, of ground and consequence: and we modern men 
are so accustomed to and brought up in the necessity of logic that it lies on our palate as the normal taste (my emphasis) and, as such, cannot 
help being repugnant to the lustful and conceited  [9].  
The fragment suggests not only that philosophy is a cultural and therefore historical matter, but also that the 
way in which we do philosophy today differs in taste from the ancient Socratic way of philosophizing. The thesis 
is also part of the Nietzschean well- immutable, 
self-justifiable theoretical worldviews. However, here Nietzsche launches another vitriolic attack: that 
philosophy, as well as any other cultural object, is determined in its methods and its results by a matter of taste 
and fashion, either common or subjective. This way, philosophy becomes  to the point of being a 
matter of the palate, or a matter of subjective taste. This aspect will be discussed later. 
 is a lot 
explaining philosophy as a form of exercising thinking 
(philosophieren), or as the ultimate, critical form of self-reflection [10]. In Nietzsche  terms, philosophy seems 
relative altogether: it springs from the needs and the interests of individuals and communities at a certain point in 
history. Thus, Nietzsche will describe philosophy (starting from the Human, All too Human onwards) as a form 
of thinking occuring in time, but in a timely fashion. Sometimes, he will critically refer to the philosophy 
regarded as a general form of History,  or :
understand philosophy only as the most general form of history, as an attempt to somehow describe the 
Heraclitean becoming and to put it into signs (to quasi translate it into some kind of apparent Being and to 
[1] (my translation). This kind of philosophy does not comply with the image of philosophy 
 
In sum, 
shades of his philosophical thinking: from the  in his Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben to his early (an , seen eventually as a manifestation of 
 [1]  Greeks in his Birth of Tragedy, 
 
 [11], we contemplate the many 
metamo
 [1] again  limitation coming from inside or from outside the 
realm of phi  as a linguistic and conceptual expression of life in its entirety, 
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mation of passing away and destruction 
that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical 
Philosophy as I have understood it and lived it so far is a life lived 
freely in ice and high mountains  visiting all the strange and questionable aspects of existence, everything 
banned by morality so far  
4.  Excurse: Lack of a unitary concept of philosophy 
4.1. The trouble with  
at defining philosophy (beyond the limits of successfulness) allegedly emphasize an 
aspect of Nietzschean philosophy which has been constantly ad  
Nietzsche postmodernism, see [12]):  that the very lack of a stable concept 
of philosophy can be useful in defending the notion of philosophy, rather than eliminate it, since this lack of a 
concept defends  against ideologizing interpretations, as it has been similarly observed in the case of 
 (the argument appears in [13]). Is this true? Is philosophy really defending itself against the prospect 
ideolog  with the use of a certain air of untruthfulness? However, the next question in line could be: Is this 
not an ideologizing interpretation of philosop  phy] is 
]? We live, obviously, in an individualistic age which is so much obsessed with 
ideology. Is this obsession with ideologies and their rejection not an ideology as well? 
Because cultural evaluations are continually being transformed, they are best dealt with via the category of 
ideology  (according to Terry Eagleton). But is this categorizing not ideological as well? Where is -
 beyond ideology which can be found in philosophy or art? The categorization of something as 
ideology  or misuse  could only be  not itself merely 
another ideology. How can this be achieved? To say that something is untrue you have to have a justified concept 
of truthfulness. Otherwise, it could be a mere self-contradiction. Bringing this discussion to the subject of our 
analysis, we may say that, u osophy does not appear to have (at least, until the 
Twilight of the Idols) a stable notion of truth (for a comprehensive analysis see [14]). Quite the contrary.  
4.2. Philosophy as  
One question has concerned  alike: is Nietzsche really an outsider to 
own philosophy and of the philosophies of others seem to indicate just that. He is keen on emphasizing the 
language-based character of thinking. He often scorns philosophers who dedicate themselves to the notion of 
truth. He is famous for  altogether. He sometimes characterizes his own 
philosophy as a self-  [2]  account on the notion of style, 
we know that  3]), because literary style refers to a discourse 
which is unique, inimitable, aesthetically significant, and immune to paraphrase [13]. Thus, literature is the only 
field where untruthfulness or illusion may serve as a shield against any ideology.  Style,  according to 
Schleiermacher, is an indeterminate  notion, in the sense that its important attributes cannot be identified, i.e. 
subsumed under an already existing concept, because they are unique to a particular text. Consequently, in the 
apparent meaningfu ].  
s to be literary texts, i.e. essentially works s 
cannot be reduced to any of the ideological  functions of a text. Here, we have a Nietzschean experiment with 
the philosophical text which really seeks to transfo  In emphasizing 
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the style,  i.e. the linguistic character of philosophical thinking, or the literary nature of its texts, Nietzsche is 
really pushing the envelope: he will definitely situate itself willingly outside the framework of philosophical 
discursive thinking. Accordingly  of other philosophical positions in general 
does not stand, since if the Nietzschean text does not let itself be criticized (i.e. would not accept a critique by 
any more or less justifiable standard of truth), it cannot criticize other texts as well. One cannot criticize 
philosophy strictly non-philosophically. Ironically, this is the same kind of objection that Nietzsche raises against 
all theological thinking: that theologians seem to criticize philosophy by appealing to a non-justifiable standard of 
truth, which is, philosophically speaking, as good as having no standard of truth whatsoever. One more 




The above mentioned  the background of 
interpretation for   In seeing philosophy as a creative activity or 
as a work of art, Nietzsche struggles to  conceptual activity, a scientific 
abstraction  although it is allegedly also perceived by Nietzsche as an activity in itself and for itself , 
independent of its producer or of its medium of communication, but an elaborate linguistic assembly (Bau) [1]. 
tonomy, questions which are not 
answered by Nietzsche. 
 would have several consequences: that there are as 
many philosophies, as there are philosophical writers; that philosophy, consequently, may be just the personal 
be just more than one single philosophy  
philosophy might create several philosophies. We have at least an analogy, if not a complete identification here 
between a  . In all philosophy hitherto 
the artist is lacking (In der ganzen Philosophi  [1;15]. To see philosophy from an 
This new optic, Nietzsche suggests, would allegedly unleash the creative side of philosophical thinking, its 
transforming and renewing power over concepts, theories, worldviews. A philosophy contemplated from the 
 
 [1], but pluralistic and creative, truthfully reflecting the infinite transformations within the world of 
becoming.   
In his endeavor, Nietzsche is not alone. He is backed up by a powerful philosophical and poetical tradition that 
starts with the Greek poets and playwrights and some Pre-platonic philosophers (Heraclitus, the Sophists). In the 
Greek mythical-philosophical accounts of the world, Nietzsche saw the common roots of art and philosophy:  
Knowledge isolates: the earlier philosophers represent in isolation what in Greek art is able to appear together. The content of art and of 
ancient philosophy is identical, but in philosophy we see the isolated elements of art being used to control the drive for knowledge. We ought 
to be able to demonstrate this in the case of the Italians, as well: individualism in life and art  [16]. 
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philosopher-artist  is clearly stirred up by the writings of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. 
However, some fragments from early 1873 clearly suggest that he is more inclined to see philosophy as identified 
with or really substituted by art, than to see the two in an analogy-relation:  
In order to create a religion one would have to awaken belief in the mythical edifice that one has constructed in a vacuum, which means that 
he would be satisfying an extraordinary need. Since the Critique of Pure Reason it is unlikely that this will ever happen again. On the other 
hand, I can imagine a wholly new sort of philosopher-artist who fills the void with a work of art, with one that has aesthetic value  [16].  
also by the Romantic thinking and by 
Schopenhauer himself. Against the vein of the German Enlightenment, Nietzsche seems to support the view that 
the value of knowledge is established by belief, not by reason itself. Therefore, the standard of truth comes from 
outside reason, not from within. view here is very similar to the view of authors, such as Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi, a cont :  
When it is a question, on the one hand, of the value of knowledge, whereas, on the other hand, a beautiful illusion, as long as one believes in 
it, has the same value as an item of knowledge, then one realizes that life requires illusions, that is, untruths that are held to be truths. It 
requires faith in the truth, but illusion is ultimately sufficient; that means that truths establish themselves not by means of logical proofs, but 
by means of their effects, proofs of strength. The true and the effective are held to be identical; here, too, one submits to force. How is one 
ance with reflection. 
All true striving for truth came into the world through the struggle for a sacred conviction, through the pathos of struggle: otherwise human 
beings have no interest in its logical origin.  The pathos of truth is related to belief ] Truth is unknowable. Everything knowable 
semblance. Significance of art as truthful semblance  [16].  
Some early posthumous fragments m  appreciation of the world, 
based on an  drive. Knowledge, even the scientific knowledge, cannot be proven by a scientific 
method. As well as in the case of Jacobi 7], reason itself cannot justify its own 
propositions, therefore is threatened by the prospect of nihilism y fragments, only art 
can save reason from itself:  
There is no distinct philosophy, separate from science: in both, the manner of thought is the same. The reason why unprovable 
philosophizing still has some value  more value, in fact, than many a scientific proposition  lies in the aesthetic value of such 
philosophizing, that is, in its beauty and sublimity. It continues to exist as a work of art even when it cannot prove itself as scientific 
In other words: it is not the pure drive for knowledge that is decisive, but rather the 
aesthetic drive: the inadequately proven philosophy of Heraclitus has far more artistic value than all  
Philosophy as the artistic drive in  Philosophy has no common denominator; at times it is science, at times ar  
Absolute knowledge leads to pessimism. Art is the remedy for this. Philosophy is indispensable for education because it draws knowledge 
into an artistic conception of the  [16]. 
One of his early philosophical fragments explores extensively the relation between art and philosophy. Here 
Nietzsche recognizes the fact that philosophy can be 
insofar as it poeticizes, and it poeticizes, insofar as it knows:   
Great quandary: whether philosophy is an art or a science. In its aims and its results it is an art. But its means, conceptual representation, it 
shares with science. It is a form of poetic artistry [Dichtkunst].  It cannot be categorized: consequently we must invent and characterize a 
species for it. The physiography of the philosopher. He arrives at knowledge by poeticizing and poeticizes by arriving at knowledge [Er 
erkennt, indem er dichtet, und dichtet, indem er erkennt]. He does not grow; I mean, philosophy does not follow the same course as the other 
sciences: even if some of the domains of philosophy gradually fall into the hands of science. Heraclitus never can be obsolete. It is poetry 
beyond the limits of experience, continuation of the mythic impulse; also essentially in images. Mathematical portrayal is not part of the 
ns of the power to create myths [mythenbildende Kräfte]. Kant remarkable  knowledge 
and faith! Inherent kinship between philosophers and founders of religions  [16].  
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6. Conclusion 
It is fairly clear by now  endured various transformations throughout 
his work and that ultimately Nietzsche took great pains to work out a concept of  that was more 
appropriate to the Early German Romantic thinkers than to the German Enlightenment theories. 
Several aspects need to be emphasized, though. First is that Ni
same throughout his entire thinking and that, at a certain point, to the end of his career as a writer, he relinquishes 
his early nihilistic views on truth, by embracing a more stable position on the problem of truth (See [14]). Thus, 
our critique of Nietzsche  will only work if Nietzsche rejects a stable notion of truth as 
style  only as 
ep
relation between art and philosophy is also ambiguously reflected by his fragments, depending on the issue at 
stake: sometimes, he declares his philosophical writing as being no more than a literary style;  sometimes, he 
identifies the artistic drive fully with the impulse for philosophizing, by conceding that it has similar roots in the 
same general human drive for creativity; sometimes he sees art as a possible substitute to philosophy (as abstract 
knowledge) or as a solution to the crisis of philosophy (as science), science which is constantly threatened by the 
prospect of nihilism. Sometimes, it seems only that he tries to seek out an analogy between philoso
artist,  with a view to emphasizing the creative character of philosophical thought. Third, it is important to 
emphasize not only the limits, but also the virtues of this Nietzschean relation between philosophy.  
This vision of philosophy as an honest, solitary, and creative undertaking for the searching of an indescribable 
 which is beyond the limits of our abstract, scientific treatment of reason, opened new pathways for 
existentialist philosophers, who nourished on Nie  tragic,  existential truth of life. The 
indiscriminate treatme style,  and the subsequent meditations on the linguistic 
nature of philosophical writing were a powerful incentive for XX-th century postmodernisms, from Lyotard to 
Derrida. philosop  has proven enormously important to XX-th century 
aesthetics and to contemporary aesthetic thinking also, by establishing a higher position to aesthetic philosophical 
thinking in the contemporary order of philosophical fields of study. Seeing philosophy as a matter of taste,
 as a criterion of philosophizing, however unorthodox this might appear to philosophical 
thinking, really gave the impetus for the development of new trends in aesthetic thinking, such as the 
 [18;19;20]).                 
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